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I. JIRODUCTION
In 1985, the Florida Legislature recognized that there was an ongoing
"insurance crisis." Accordingly, the Comprehensive Medical Malpractice
Reform Act of 1985 ("Ace') was enacted for the purpose of ensuring that
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the citizens of Florida have available competent and reasonably priced
medical services.' The legislation intended to ease the threat to the
continued availability of high quality care caused by escalating premium
costs for professional liability insurance.' The Act requires a medical
malpractice plaintiff to put a prospective defendant on notice that a suit
asserting professional negligence will be filed against the defendant. The
notice of intent is a condition precedent to the filing of a lawsuit.4 This
requirement, along with others in the statute, ostensibly promotes settlement
of medical malpractice claims and consequently reduces the overall societal
cost of health care.
This article is a detailed analysis of the presuit discovery provisions of
the Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1985 and the
interpretation and application of the Act by Florida courts. This analysis
provides a procedural guidance for practitioners to anticipate how courts
may interpret the provisions of the statute in particular cases.
II. STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
A. The Notice of Intent to Initiate Litigation
The Act applies to those causes of action filed after October 1, 1985'
and requires a claimant to send to prospective defendants a formal, written
"notice of intent to initiate litigation" advising them that a suit will be filed
against them.6 As an additional requirement, the notice of intent must be
accompanied by a verified, written opinion of a medical expert.7 The
notice of intent is a condition precedent to the institution of a claim.8 A
copy of the notice of intent must be furnished to the Department of Business
1. Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1985, ch. 85-175, 1985 Fla. Laws
1183 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.106 (1985)). In 1988, the Florida Legislature enacted
§ 766.201 through § 766.212. Ch. 88-1, §§ 48-59, 1988 Fla. Laws 119, 164-73. That same
year, the legislature strengthened § 766.106 of the Florida Statutes. See 1988 Fla. Laws ch.
88-173; 1988 Fla. Laws ch. 88-277. The changes were enacted with the stated intent of
providing a plan for the prompt resolution of medical malpractice claims.
2. Ch. 85-175, 1985 Fla. Laws at 1183.
3. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(2) (Supp. 1994).
4. Id.; Hospital Corp. of Am. v. Lindberg, 571 So. 2d 446, 448 (Fla. 1990); Pearlstein
v. Malunney, 500 So. 2d 585, 586 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
5. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(13) (Supp. 1994).
6. Id. § 766.106(2).
7. Id. § 766.203(2) (1993).
8. Id. § 766.106(2) (Supp. 1994); see also Patry v. Capps, 633 So. 2d 9, 11 (Fla. 1994);
Williams v. Campagnulo, 588 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1991).
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and Professional Regulation and must include the full name and address of
the claimant and any prospective defendants who are health care providers
licensed under chapters 458, 459, 460, 461, or 466 of the Florida Statutes.9
The notice must also include the "date and a summary of the occurrence
giving rise to the claim[ ] and a description of the injury to the claimant."'
Once notice has been given, the claimant cannot file suit for ninety days.1
The purpose of this ninety-day period is to toll the statute of limitations as
to all properly notified defendants. 2 Ninety days after the defendant
receives the notice of intent letter, the plaintiff may file suit, and has either
sixty days or the remainder of the time left under the statute of limitations
to file suit, whichever is greater. 3
B. Presuit Investigation by the Parties
Once the prospective defendant receives the notice, the defendant's
insurer or self-insurer must review and evaluate the claim utilizing one of
the several methods set forth in the statute. 4 Both the claimant and the
prospective defendant are required to cooperate with the insurer during this
evaluation process.' Furthermore, the claimant may be required to appear
before a screening panel or medical review committee, or submit to a
physical examination. 6 If a party unreasonably fails to comply with this
section, the court is justified in dismissing the claims or defenses. 7
Sometime before the end of the ninety-day period, the insurer or self-
insurer must serve the claimant with a response either admitting liability,
rejecting the claim, or offering a settlement. 8 This response must then be
evaluated by the claimant's attorney who must utilize the procedures set
forth in the statute.'9 Should the recipient of a notice letter respond by
denying liability, the denial letter must be accompanied by a verified written
medical expert opinion.2"
9. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(2) (Supp. 1994).
10. Id.
11. Id. § 766.106(3)(a).
12. Id § 766.106(4).
13. IM; Boyd v. Becker, 627 So. 2d 481, 482 (Fla. 1993); Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So. 2d
177, 182-84 (Fla. 1993).
14. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(3)(a) (Supp. 1994); Boyd, 627 So. 2d at 484.
15. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(3)(a) (Supp. 1994).
16. IM
17. Id.
18. Id § 766.106(3)(b).
19. Id § 766.106(3)(d).
20. FLA. STAT. § 766.203(3)(b) (1993).
1995]
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C. Presuit Investigation by the Court
1. Dismissal of the Claims and Defenses
The statute permits the court, upon a request by any party, "to
determine whether the opposing party's claim or denial rests on a reasonable
basis. 21 Section 766.206(2) clearly states that if:
the notice of intent to initiate litigation mailed by the claimant is not in
compliance with the ... requirements of [the statute], the court shall
dismiss the claim, and the person who mailed [the defective] notice of
intent, whether the claimant or the claimant's attorney, shall be
personally liable for all attorney's fees and costs incurred during the
investigation and evaluation of the claim.22
Similarly, if the court finds that the defendant's response rejecting the
claim fails to comply with the reasonable investigation requirements, the
court must strike the defendant's response.23 Thus, the person who mailed
the defective response, whether the defendant or the defendant's insurer or
attorney, will be held personally liable for all attorney's fees and costs.24
2. Disciplinary Action
In addition to dismissal of the claim or defense, noncompliance with
the statute could result in the matter being submitted to the Florida Bar for
disciplinary review. For example, section 766.206(4) provides that if the
court finds that an attorney for the claimant mailed a notice of intent without
a reasonable investigation, that the attorney filed a medical negligence claim
without first mailing the proper notice of intent, or that the defendant's
attorney mailed a response rejecting the claim without a reasonable investi-
gation, the court must submit its findings in the matter to the Florida Bar for
disciplinary review. Any attorney reported to the Florida Bar three or
more times within a five-year period must be reported to a circuit grievance
committee acting under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Florida. 6
21. Id. § 766.206(1).
22. Id. § 766.206(2) (emphasis added). These fees and costs include those incurred by
the defendant and the defendant's insurer. Id.
23. Id. § 766.206(3).
24. FLA. STAT. § 766.206(3) (1993).
25. Id. § 766.206(4).
26. Id.
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If the grievance committee finds probable cause to believe that an attorney
has violated the presuit investigation requirements, the committee must
forward a copy of its findings to the Supreme Court of Florida for
review 2
7
The expert who provided the corroborating medical opinion may also
be subjected to disciplinary action. The statute provides that if the court
finds that the corroborating written medical expert opinion attached to any
notice of intent, or to any response rejecting a claim was not based upon
reasonable investigation, the court must report the expert to the Division of
Medical Quality Assurance. 28 Section 766.206(5)(b) permits'the court to
refuse to consider the testimony of any expert who has been disqualified
three times pursuant to this section.29
III. FLOPIDA CASE LAW
A. Presuit Requirements
There are a number of Florida cases construing theabove-mentioned
requirements. Public Health Trust v. Knuckl0 is the first Florida case that
interpreted the Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1985.
In Knuck, Blanche Freundlich filed a medical malpractice suit against
various defendants, including Public Health Trust of Dade County and Dr.
Peritz Scheinberg. The suit was filed on February 10, 1986 as a conse-
quence of allegedly negligent medical care rendered on February 16, 1984.
Although Freundlich had provided notice to the hospital prior to filing suit,
she failed to give notice to the University of Miami and Dr. Scheinberg.
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint because Freundlich failed
to serve the requisite notice of intent to initiate medical malpractice
litigation on the University of Miami and Dr. Scheinberg during the
27. Id
28. lId § 766.206(5)(a).
29. FLA. STAT. § 766.206(5)0b) (1993); see Faber v. Wrobel, 20 Fla. L. Weekly D1730,
D1731 (2d Dist. Ct. App. July 28, 1995) (stating that the standard for disqualification of
medical experts is less stringent than the standard for the qualifications required to offer
expert testimony at trial). But see Winson v. Norman, 658 So. 2d 625, 626 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1995) (holding that a doctor who has not been engaged in the actual practice of
medicine for more than ten years and who has limited his professional activities to acting as
a professional "litigation expert" was not a medical expert qualified to execute a verified
medical opinion affidavit as required by the statute).
30. 495 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
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applicable statute of limitations period.31 In addition, the plaintiff failed
to observe the mandatory ninety-day presuit screening period prior to filing
suit,32 and failed to plead the good faith certificate alleging compliance
with statutory requirements.33
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff argued that the
filing of the complaint tolled the statute of limitations and requested that the
trial court abate the action pending compliance with the neglected statutory
requirements. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion to abate the
action pending the necessary compliance with the statute.34 The defendants
filed a petition for writ of prohibition, asking the Third District Court of
Appeal to preclude the trial court from reviving the abated action.
The Third District Court of Appeal granted the writ and prohibited the
trial court from reviving the action against the University of Miami and Dr.
Scheinberg.36 The court held that the applicable statute of limitations was
not tolled because of the plaintiff's failure to serve a notice of intent to
initiate litigation according to section 768.57(2) of the Florida Statutes.37
The court denied the writ against Jackson Memorial Hospital since that
defendant had received the required notice within the applicable statute of
limitations period.38
For guidance, the court turned to cases interpreting section 768.28(6),
which deals with notice requirements in sovereign immunity cases. 39 The
court stated that because the notice of intent to initiate litigation had not
been served, the statute of limitations had not been tolled; thus, the
limitation period expired soon after the complaint was filed.' The court
concluded that the statutory period expired before the required notice of
intent had been given to the University of Miami and Dr. Scheinberg, and
thus, the trial court erred in abating the action as to those defendants.4'
31. Id. at 835 (citing FLA. STAT. § 768.57(2) (1985)). Under the applicable statute of
limitations, an action in negligence must be commenced within four years from the date of
the injury. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1993).
32. Knuck, 495 So. 2d at 835 (citing FLA. STAT. § 768.57(3)(a) (1985)).
33. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 768.495 (1985)).
34. Id. at 836.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 837.
37. Knuck, 495 So. 2d at 837.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 836.
40. Id. at 837.
41. Id.
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The court expressly rejected Freundlich's argument that the notice sent to
Jackson Memorial Hospital sufficed as notice to all defendants. 42
The Knuck decision was followed by the Second District Court of
Appeal in Pearlstein v. Malunney43 and was cited with approval in Lynn
v. Miller.' In Pearlstein, the plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action
without complying with the statutory notice provisions of section 768.57 of
the Florida Statutes.45 As a result, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss
based upon the plaintiff's failure to comply with the mandatory requirements
of the statute. The trial court denied the motion, holding that section 768.57
unreasonably discriminates against medical malpractice litigants, deprives
litigants of their constitutional right of access to the courts, and is unconsti-
tutionally vague.46 The trial court ruled that the complaint itself satisfied
the notice requirements of the statute and directed the defendants to file an
answer to the complaint.47 The defendants subsequently sought a writ of
certiorari in the Second District Court of Appeal.
The Second District Court of Appeal upheld the constitutionality of the
48prefiling notice requirements. The court recognized that the Act was
enacted in response to a perceived crisis in the availability of reasonably
priced health care services due to escalating medical malpractice insurance
premiums.49 Further, the court found that a valid legislative purpose exists
in ensuring the protection of public health by assuring the availability of
adequate medical care.50 Thus, the district court quashed that portion of
the trial court's ruling which directed the defendants to answer the com-
plaint.51 The court indicated that the notice requirement is a condition
precedent to filing suit and held that a complaint filed without notice is "for
all intents and purposes, a nonexistent lawsuit.' 52
In Lynn v. Miller,53 the court reiterated that compliance with the
requirements of section 768.57 is a condition precedent to maintaining a suit
42. Knuck, 495 So. 2d at 837.
43. 500 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986), review denied, 511 So. 2d 299 (Fla.
1987).
44. 498 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
45. Pearlstein, 500 So. 2d at 586.
46. Id.
47. Id at 586-87.
48. Id. at 587.
49. Id. at 586.
50. Pearlstein, 500 So. 2d at 586.
51. Id, at 587.
52. Id.
53. 498 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
1995] 459
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which must be satisfied within the applicable statute of limitations period. 4
The court explained that if the limitations period has run, a trial court lacks
the authority to abate a premature complaint even if, but for the prefiling
notice requirements, the complaint would have been timely filed.5
The Second District Court of Appeal, however, found that the
commencement of a malpractice suit must be distinguished from the
existence of a cause of action. For example, in Malunney v. Pearlstein,56
the court found that the purpose of section 768.57 is wholly procedural
because it provides potential defendants "with an opportunity to resolve
amicably the controversy without the burden of a lawsuit.' 57 The court
held that section 768.57 has no effect upon the continuing existence of a
cause of action.5 8  Accordingly, where the initial complaint is dismissed
because the plaintiff fails to allege that a notice of intent to initiate litigation
was sent to potential defendants, the filing of a new lawsuit properly
alleging notice will not be barred by the doctrine of res judicata 9
There are a number of other significant cases addressing the required
statutory notice. For example, in Glineck v. Lentz,' the court held that
oral notice of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation is insufficient
compliance with the statute.6' In Wilkenson v. Golden,62 the court held
that a patient's letter to a dentist's insurance carrier did not constitute a
"notice of intent" where the letter was not sent by certified mail, nor was it
accompanied by a corroborating medical report.63 The statute does not
allow for constructive notice, oral notice, or notice by publication.'
However, there is no need to give a separate notice of intent to a physician
by a spouse of the injured person in a loss of consortium claim. 65 This is
54. Id. at 1012.
55. Id.
56. 539 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
57. Id. at 495; see also Castro v. Davis, 527 So. 2d 250, 251 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1988).
58. Malunney, 539 So. 2d at 496.
59. Id. at 495.
60. 524 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 534 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 1988).
61. Id. at 458.
62. 630 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
63. Id. at 1241.
64. FLA. STAT. § 766.106 (Supp. 1994); see Ingersoll v. Hoffman, 561 So. 2d 324, 325
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990), quashed on other grounds, 589 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1991).
65. Chandler v. Novak, 596 So. 2d 749, 751 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992). But see
Scarlett v. Public Health Trust, 584 So. 2d 75, 75 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (dismissing
the spouse's claim for loss of consortium because the notice only referred to one spouse),
overruled sub nom. Chandler, 596 So. 2d at 750.
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because a derivative action is not a separate and distinct action; it is
completely dependent upon the original action filed by the injured spouse.
In Solimando v. International Medical Centers,66 the Second District
Court of Appeal addressed the issue of whether a notice of intent sent by
regular United States mail, rather than the statutorily specified certified mail,
sufficiently complied with the Act. The plaintiff had filed a medical
malpractice suit against a number of health care providers. However, the
plaintiff's attorney sent the notice of intent to initiate litigation by regular
mail rather than by certified mail. As a result, the defendants filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. They argued that the plaintiff failed to comply with the mailing
provisions of sections 768.57(2) and 768.57(3)(a) which require that the
notice of intent be sent by certified mail.67
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff argued that some
of the health care providers waived the statutory requirements that the notice
be sent by certified mail because the insurance carriers of the health care
providers acknowledged receipt of the notice. Furthermore, the carriers had
responded with letters indicating that they were reviewing the case to
determine whether there was any liability. Thus, the plaintiff argued that the
defendants should be estopped from asserting that notice sent by regular
mail is insufficient. Although the trial court did not address the issue of
waiver or estoppel, it ruled that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear
the case.68 The court only had jurisdiction to grant the motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the plaintiff's failure to comply
with the procedure for mailing notice.69
On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal rejected the trial court's
ruling in holding that the notice requirements are not jurisdictional and are
subject to waiver.71 The court indicated that the failure to comply with the
prelitigation notice requirements of section 768.57 does not deprive the trial
court of subject matter jurisdiction.71 Thus, trial courts may consider the
principles of estoppel and waiver in deciding whether to excuse a party for
noncompliance. 72 Nevertheless, the court did warn that it is essential for the
66. 544 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 549 So. 2d 1013 (Fla.
1989).
67. Id at 1032.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1033-34.
71. Solimando, 544 So. 2d at 1034-35.
72. Id at 1035.
1995]
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complaint to allege compliance with the statute.73 However, in recognizing
the difficulty facing a plaintiff who may not be able to frame a complaint
invoking the jurisdiction of the court, the court adopted and approved the
view that a complaint setting forth factual allegations concerning waiver of
the notice requirements of section 768.28(6) satisfies the presuit notice
requirements of the statute.74 Accordingly, a medical malpractice plain-
tiffs failure to comply with pre-litigation notice requirements does not
necessarily deprive a trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. Furthermore,
a trial judge may consider principles of estoppel and waiver in deciding
whether to excuse the plaintiff for noncompliance.
75
B. Amending the Complaint
The issue of whether a trial court in a medical malpractice action could
permit amendment of a complaint so as to allege compliance with the
presuit requirements was first addressed in Lindberg v. Hospital Corp.76
In Lindberg, the plaintiffs, Kurt and Mary Lindberg, filed a medical
malpractice action on April 4, 1986 against the Hospital Corporation of
America, Dr. Jamie Alalu, Dr. Robert Liem, and Dr. Bernard Cheong,
alleging negligent care and treatment of Kurt Lindberg in April and May of
1984. On the same day the complaint was filed, the plaintiffs sent notices
of intent to initiate litigation to each defendant by certified mail. The
defendants, however, filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint
because the plaintiffs failed to comply with conditions precedent to filing a
complaint. Specifically, the defendants alleged that the plaintiffs failed to
notify the defendants of their intent to sue within the statute of limitations
period. The motion alleged further that the plaintiffs' failure divested the
court of its subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case, thus requiring
dismissal.7 7 At the hearing on the defendants' motion to dismiss, the
plaintiffs requested leave to amend their complaint to allege that the notice
requirement had been satisfied. The trial court dismissed the cause of
action, and refused to grant the plaintiffs' leave to amend.78 The plaintiffs
appealed.
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing Bryant v. Duval County Hosp. Auth., 502 So. 2d 459, 462-63 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1986), review denied, 511 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 1987)).
75. Bryant, 502 So. 2d at 462.
76. 545 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
77. Id. at 1384-85.
78. Id. at 1385.
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In reversing the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal held that the statute of limitations had been tolled
because notice had been given within the statutory period.79 Thus, the trial
court should have permitted the plaintiff to amend the complaint so as to
allege compliance with the statutory prerequisites.80
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on Holding Electric, Inc.
v. Roberts,"' which held that under section 713.06(3)(d)(1), delivery of a
contractor's affidavit is not jurisdictional, although it is a prerequisite to
maintaining the action and must be completed within the statutory limitation
period. 2 Therefore, the trial court has authority to allow the plaintiffs to
amend the complaint provided that the notice is given within the appropriate
statute of limitations period. 3 However, because the Fourth District Court
of Appeal acknowledged that its holding directly conflicts with Pearlsteins4
and Malunney 5 it certified the following question to the Supreme Court of
Florida:
IS THE FAILURE TO FOLLOW THE PRE-SUIT SCREENING
PROCESS OF SECTION 768.57, FLORIDA STATUTES, A FATAL
JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT OR MAY IT BE CORRECTED BY
FOLLOWING THE PROCEDURE SUBSEQUENT TO FILING THE
COMPLAINT SO LONG AS THE NOTICE OF INTENT TO
LITIGATE IS SERVED WITHIN THE STATUTORY LIMITATIONS
PERIOD? 6
The supreme court answered the certified question in Hospital Corp.
of America v. Lindberg.7 The court held that "in medical malpractice
actions, if a presuit notice is served at the same time [the] complaint is filed,
the complaint is subject to dismissal with leave to amend."88 The court
held further that "[t]he plaintiff may subsequently file an amended complaint
asserting compliance with the presuit notice and screening requirements of
79. Id. at 1388.
80. Id.
81. 530 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 1988).
82. Lindberg, 545 So. 2d at 1388 (citing Roberts, 530 So. 2d at 303).
83. Id.
84. 500 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986), review denied, 511 So. 2d 299 (Fla.
1987).
85. 539 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 547 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 1989).
86. Lindberg, 545 So. 2d at 1388.
87. 571 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1990).
88. Id at 449.
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section 768.57 and the presuit investigation and certification requirements
of section 768.495(1)." 89 However, practitioners in the field of medical
malpractice should note that failure to timely file the presuit notice within
the statute of limitations period will require dismissal of the complaint.90
In Southern Neurosurgical Associates, P.A., v. Fine,9 the court held
that where the limitation period has not yet run, a presuit notice served
simultaneously with the filing of the complaint will cause the complaint to
be dismissed with leave to amend.92 The plaintiff may then file an
amended complaint alleging compliance with presuit notice and screening
requirements.93 However, if the statutory period for initiating the suit has
run before the plaintiff satisfies the presuit notice or screening requirements,
the trial court will be divested of subject matter jurisdiction.9"
C. The Mode of Service
The Supreme Court of Florida, in Patry v. Capps,95 answered a
certified question regarding whether the certified mail requirement for the
notice of intent letter is a substantive element of the statute or a procedural
one which can be disregarded by the trial court once the defendant receives
actual written notice in a timely manner that does not result in any
prejudice.96 In Patry, a medical malpractice action was filed against Dr.
William Capps for negligence in delivering the Patrys' child by caesarean
section. The trial court dismissed the action because the plaintiffs failed to
comply with the mode of service required in the statutes.9 Dr. Capps was
served with the Patrys' intent to initiate litigation by hand delivery rather
than by certified mail. The district court relied on Solimando and Glineck
in affirming the trial court's dismissal.98
In deciding whether strict compliance with the mode of service is
mandated, the Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the purpose behind the
89. Id.
90. See Miami Physical Therapy Assocs. v. Savage, 632 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1994).
91. 591 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
92. Id. at 254-55.
93. Id. at 255.
94. Id.; see also Berry v. Orr, 537 So. 2d 1014, 1015 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988),
review denied, 545 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 1989).
95. 633 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1994).
96. Id. at 10.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 13.
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legislation.99 The court recognized that the purpose of the Act is to
promote the resolution of medical malpractice claims early in the claim
process so as to avoid a full, adversarial proceeding."0 The court con-
cluded that the statutory requirements regarding the mode of service were
"merely a technical matter of form that was designed to facilitate the orderly
and prompt conduct of the screening and settlement process by establishing
a method for verifying significant dates in the process. ' .. In this case,
because Dr. Capps acknowledged timely receipt of the written notice and
was not prejudiced by the method of delivery, the supreme court held that
strict compliance with the statute was not required.0 2 However, the court
emphasized that unlike the general notice requirement in section 768.57(2),
the mode of service authorized in the statute does not go to the heart of the
presuit notice and screening process.'0 3 The court disapproved Solimando
and Glineck because they conflicted with the court's opinion."
D. Health Care Practitioners
The purpose of the notice provision is not to deny access to the
courts,'0 5 or function as a trap for medical malpractice claimants."
Instead, it is designed to resolve claims amicably.'07 In Weinstock v.
Groth,'0° the Supreme Court of Florida was faced with the issue of
whether a clinical psychologist is a "health care provider" for purposes of
determining whether a plaintiff must comply with the notice requirements
of section 766.106(2). The court held that prospective defendants in medical
negligence actions are "health care providers" as defined in section
99. lId at 11.
100. Patry, 633 So. 2d at 11-12; see Ingersoll v. Hoffman, 589 So. 2d 223, 224 (Fla.
1991) (holding that the Act purports to aid in amicably resolving medical malpractice
claims); see also Boyd v. Becker, 627 So. 2d 481, 484 (Fla. 1993) (stating that the purpose
of the Act is to facilitate the resolution of claims prior to trial); Williams v. Campagnulo, 588
So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1991) (stating that the Act promotes settlement at an early stage).
101. Patry, 633 So. 2d at 12.
102. Id. at 13.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So. 2d 835, 838 (Fla. 1993).
106. Zacker v. Croft, 609 So. 2d 140, 142 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review denied,
620 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 1993).
107. Moore v. Winterhaven Hosp., 579 So. 2d 188, 189 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.) (citing
Castro v. Davis, 527 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988)), review denied, 589 So. 2d
294 (Fla. 1991).
108. 629 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1993).
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768.50(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes. °9 The court also recognized that the
clear purpose of the Act is to promote settlement of medical malpractice
claims in order to reduce the overall societal cost of health care and not to
deny access to the courts."' Accordingly, the court held that "the proper
test for determining whether a defendant is entitled to notice under section
766.106(2) is whether the defendant is directly or vicariously liable under
the medical negligence standard of care set forth in section 766.102(1)."'
Thus, because psychologists are not included in the definition of a "health
care provider" in section 766.50(2)(b), the plaintiff was not required to
comply with the notice requirement of section 768.106(2).
On the other hand, a potential defendant who does not fall within the
definition of a "health care provider" may nevertheless be entitled to
statutory notice if the defendant is vicariously liable for the acts of the
health care provider." 2 Therefore, the employer of a health care provider
may also be a prospective defendant even though the employer does not fall
within the statutory definition of a health care provider. 3  Such an
employer "may be vicariously liable under the professional medical
negligence standard of care... when its agent or employee, who is a health
care provider, negligently renders medical care or services.""' 4 For
example, in NME Properties, Inc. v. McCullough,"5 the court held that a
nursing home, which is not defined as a health care provider under the
statutes, is entitled to statutory notice of a negligence action against it
because the nursing home is vicariously liable for nurses who are both
employees and health care providers. 16
E. Statute of Limitations
In Zacker v. Croft,'17 a patient who suffered a heart attack after being
treated for chest pains brought a medical malpractice suit against his
physician. The patient mailed a notice of intent to initiate litigation to the
109. Id. at 837.
110. Id. at 838 (citing Ragoonanan v. Associates in Obstetrics & Gynecology, 619 So.
2d 482 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Weinstock, 629 So. 2d at 838.
114. Id. (citing NME Properties, Inc. v. McCullough, 590 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1991)).
115. 590 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
116. Id. at 441.
117. 609 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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physician's last known address. The issue before the court was whether the
patient tolled the statute of limitations by mailing the notice of intent to an
incorrect address.118 The court stated that insofar as the claimants exer-
cised reasonable care and diligence to determine the correct address, the
statute of limitations was tolled." 9 The court upheld the tolling of the
limitations period in order to comply with the purpose of the notice
requirements which is to promote the settlement of medical malpractice
claims and not to be used as a trap for medical malpractice plaintiffs. 20
It is important to note here that, although certain information must be
contained in the notice, the statute does not require any particular form or
specific wording.' The Fifth District Court of Appeal, in Shands
Teaching Hospital & Clinic, Inc. v. Barber," held that the notice only
needs to describe the occurrence of the underlying claim and include "the
expert corroborative opinion [which] is designed to prevent the filing of
baseless litigation."" The court held that the notice of intent letter, coupled
with the corroborating affidavit, adequately described the incident which
gave rise to the negligence claim.124 Therefore, the purpose of the
statutory notice provision had been fulfilled."z
F. The Ninety-Day Extension
Another significant aspect of the Act is the provision for an extension
of the ninety-day presuit screening period.12 6  Under the statute, the
plaintiff must conduct a reasonable investigation to determine whether there
is a good faith belief that the defendant was negligent in the care and
treatment of the plaintiff. 27 The notice of intent must then be served
upon prospective defendants within the statutory period prescribed in section
95.11 of the Florida Statutes. However, section 766.104 permits an
automatic ninety-day extension of the statute of limitations for those who
petition the clerk of the court where the suit will be filed and who pay the
118. Id. at 141.
119. Id. at 142.
120. Id.
121. See Tracey v. Barrett, 550 So. 2d 558, 560 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
122. 638 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Stebilla v. Musallem, 595 So.
2d 136, 138 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 604 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 1992)).
123. Id. at 572.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. FLA. STAT. § 766.104(2) (1993).
127. Id. § 766.104(1).
1995]
15
Khouzam: Medical Malpractice: A Review of the Presuit Screening Provisions
Published by NSUWorks, 1995
Nova Law Review
filing fee.'28 In Kalbach v. Day, 29 the court examined the ninety-day
extension for filing medical malpractice actions and determined that it is "in
addition to other tolling periods."'30  The court held that the extension
begins to run after the ninety-day tolling provision under section 766.106
which commences after the notice of intent to initiate litigation has been
mailed.'
Computation of the ninety-day screening period was addressed by the
Supreme Court of Florida in Boyd v. Becker.'32 The court reviewed the
appellate court's opinion which noted a conflict between Barron v.
Crenshaw,'33 sections 766.106(3)(c) and 766.106(3)(a) of the Florida
Statutes, and rule 1.650 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.'34
The court analyzed the statutory provisions involved and adopted the
Fifth District Court of Appeal's decision which modified rule 1.650 of the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.'35 In Boyd, the defendant, Dr. Becker,
performed an operation on Mr. Boyd on June 3, 1988 which resulted in an
unexpected scar on Mr. Boyd's neck. On June 2, 1990, Mr. Boyd applied
for and received an automatic extension of the statute of limitations pursuant
to section 766.104(2). On August 30, 1990, before the expiration of the
ninety-day extension period, Mr. Boyd mailed to Dr. Becker a notice of
intent to initiate litigation. The notice of intent was received by Dr. Becker
on September 3, 1990. On February 1, 1991, Mr. Boyd filed suit against
Dr. Becker. However, February 1st was the last day of Mr. Boyd's final
extension which was computed from the date that the notice of intent was
128. Id. § 766.104(2). Section 766.104(2) provides that:
Upon petition to the clerk of the court where the suit will be filed and payment
to the clerk of the filing fee, not to exceed $25, established by the chief judge,
an automatic 90-day extension of the statute of limitations shall be granted to
allow the reasonable investigation required by subsection (1). This period shall
be in addition to other tolling periods. No court order 'is required for the
extension to be effective. The provisions of this subsection shall not be deemed
to revive a cause of action on which the statute of limitations has run.
Id.
129. 589 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991), dismissed sub nom. Frei v. Kalbach,
598 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1992).
130. Id. at 449 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 766.104(2) (1989)).
131. Id. at 450.
132. 627 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1993).
133. 573 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
134. Boyd, 627 So. 2d at 482.
135. Id. at 484 (adopting the holding in Barron, 573 So. 2d at 19).
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received by Dr. Becker, rather than the date the notice of intent was
mailed.3 6
Dr. Becker moved for dismissal arguing that Mr. Boyd's claim was
barred by the statute of limitations. In support of his position, Dr. Becker
"relied on the language in section 766.106(3)(a) that states: 'No suit may
be filed for a period of 90 days after notice [of intent to initiate litigation]
is mailed to any prospective defendant."",13 7  Dr. Becker argued that
because the notice letter was mailed on August 30, 1990, the tolling of the
statute of limitations began on that date and ended ninety days later on
November 28, 1990. It was submitted that the claim should have been filed
on or before January 28, 1991 which includes the sixty-day extension
authorized under section 766.106(4). The defense asserted that on
November 28, 1990, there was an implicit rejection of plaintiff's claim
which triggered the countdown for the sixty-day extension."3 8
In response, however, Mr. Boyd argued that the ninety-day presuit
period should be calculated based on the language in section 766.106(3)(c)
which states that "[flailure of the prospective defendant [or insurer or self-
insurer] to reply to the notice within 90 days after receipt shall be deemed
a final rejection of the claim [for purposes of this section].' 1 9 According-
ly, Mr. Boyd argued that because the final sixty-day period began on
December 3, 1990, ninety days after Dr. Becker received the notice, the
lawsuit was timely filed on February 1, 1991."
The court recognized that section 766.106(3)(a) conflicts with section
766.106(3)(c) because the latter provision computes the time period when
the notice is mailed and the former from the date it is received."' The
court held that the conflict should be resolved in a way that allows the claim
136. Id. at 482-83.
137. Id. at 483 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 766.106(3)(a) (1989)) (alteration in original).
138. Id. Section 766.106(4) reads as follows:
The notice of intent to initiate litigation shall be served within the time limits set
forth in s. 95.11. However, during the 90-day period, the statute of limitations
is tolled as to all potential defendants. Upon stipulation by the parties, the 90-
day period may be extended and the statute of limitations is tolled during any
such extension. Upon receiving notice of termination of negotiations in an
extended period, the claimant shall have 60 days or the remainder of the period
of the statute of limitations, whichever is greater, within which to file suit.
FLA. STAT. § 766.106(4) (Supp. 1994).
139. Boyd, 627 So. 2d at 483 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 766.106(3)(c) (1989)) (alteration
in original).
140. Id.
141. Id at 483.
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to be considered on its merits. 42 To hold otherwise would effectively
limit the time the defendant would have to evaluate the merits of the claim,
which in turn would defeat the legislative intent of allowing each defendant
a full ninety days to evaluate the merits of the claim. 43 The court then
modified rule 1.650(d)(2) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure to
conform with the Fifth District Court of Appeal's ruling in Barron v.
Crenshaw.'" The Barron court ruled that the ninety-day period for filing
a response is computed from the date the notice is received. 145  To
reconcile the difference, the court deleted the word "mailed" and inserted the
word "received.' 14
6
In Mason v. Bisogno,147 the court determined when the sixty-day
provision of the statute begins to run. The court held that rule 1.650(d)(2)
is clear and unambiguous in providing that the statute of limitations com-
mences on the earliest of several events. 48 For example, commencement
of the limitations period would include the claimant's receipt of a written
rejection of the claim or the expiration of an extension of the ninety-day
presuit period. 49 Therefore, in order to avoid an action from being time
barred, the lawsuit must be filed before the earlier of either receipt of a
written rejection or the expiration of the ninety-day extension period.
Additionally, the ninety-day period may be extended upon stipulation
by the parties, thus tolling the statute of limitations during any such
extension.15' However, practitioners should note that an extension of the
ninety-day presuit screening period as to some of the defendants does not
toll the statute of limitations as to all defendants involved in the medical
malpractice action.
G. Pretrial Settlement
Included among its many objectives, the Act is also designed to
encourage pretrial settlement of meritorious claims in order to avoid
142. Id.
143. Id. at 484.
144. Boyd, 627 So. 2d at 484; see Barron v. Crenshaw, 573 So. 2d 17, 19 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1990).
145. Barron, 573 So. 2d at 19.
146. Boyd, 627 So. 2d at 484.
147. 633 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 641 So. 2d 1345 (Fla.
1994).
148. Id. at 467.
149. Id.
150. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 766.104(4) (1991)).
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expensive litigation and to anticipate further increases in medical malpractice
insurance premiums. 151 The Act requires potential parties to assist an
insurer or self-insurer in its investigation of potential claims. 52 The Act
also requires potential parties to engage in informal discovery during the
presuit investigation period in order to promote and expedite discovery.'
Section 766.106(6) states that "[u]pon receipt by a prospective defendant of
a notice of claim, the parties shall make discoverable information available
without formal discovery. Failure to do so is grounds for dismissal of
claims or defenses ultimately asserted.' 54
In Morris v. Ergos,55 the defendant physician appealed an order
striking his defenses for failure to timely respond to presuit discovery
requests. In reversing the trial court's order, the Second District Court of
Appeal held that the striking of the physician's defenses was too excessive
a remedy. 56 The court reasoned that "[w]hile the physician's failure to
respond to the discovery questions until after suit was filed was clearly
neglectful and it is questionable whether under the circumstances ... the
neglect was excusable, we conclude that the striking of his defenses was too
harsh a remedy."' 57 The court further stated that "even when a party's
conduct in response to discovery requests is 'laggard and slothful,' dismissal
of a suit is not necessarily warranted."'' 5  Thus, dismissal is justified "only
in extreme situations for flagrant or aggravated cases of disobedience.
'1 59
151. MacDonald v. Mclver, 514 So. 2d 1151, 1152 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
152. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(3)(a) (Supp. 1994). The section provides that:
Each insurer or self-insurer shall investigate the claim in good faith, and both
the claimant and prospective defendant shall cooperate with the insurer in good
faith. If the insurer requires, a claimant shall appear before a pretrial screening
panel or before a medical review committee and shall submit to a physical
examination, if required. Unreasonable failure of any party to comply with this
section justifies dismissal of claims or defenses.
Id. (emphasis added).
153. Id. § 766.106(6).
154. Id. (emphasis added). These provisions of the Act were tested and upheld in the
following cases: Duffy v. Brooker, 614 So. 2d 539 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.), review denied,
624 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1993); Pinellas Emergency Mental Health Servs. Inc. v. Richardson, 532
So. 2d 60 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988); and Morris v. Ergos, 532 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1988).
155. 532 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
156. Id. at 1361.
157. Id.
158. Id. (quoting Summit Chase Condominium Ass'n v. Protean Investors, Inc., 421 So.
2d 562, 564 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982)).
159. Id. (quoting Summit Chase Condominium Ass'n, 421 So. 2d at 564).
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However, in this case, it did not appear that the plaintiffs in Morris were
prejudiced by the delay or that time was of the essence because they did not
file suit for nearly five months after the expiration of the ninety-day
period.' 6° Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the action for
further proceedings.'
61
In Pinellas Emergency Mental Health Services, Inc. v. Richardson,'
62
the court vacated the trial court's order dismissing the defendant's answer
and defenses in a medical malpractice action.163 A notice of intent to
initiate litigation was sent to the defendant, Pinellas Emergency Mental
Health Service ("PEMHS"), with an accompanying discovery request,
including a series of interrogatories and a request for production. The notice
informed PEMHS that either the center or its medical malpractice insurance
company was required by law to conduct a good faith investigation of the
claim and serve a response to the claimant's attorney within ninety days.
However, no response was furnished. The claimant's attorney sent a second
discovery request which was also ignored by PEMHS. Suit was subsequent-
ly filed against PEMHS and several other defendants. The trial court
entered a default judgment against PEMHS for failing to respond to the
complaint."6 The default was ultimately set aside and the court allowed
PEMHS to file an answer and affirmative defenses to the complaint.
165
Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the PEMHS's answer and
defenses on the basis of the health service's failure to respond to the
discovery requests and to follow the procedures contained in the Act. The
trial court entered an order dismissing PEMHS's answer and defenses on the
basis that, as a matter of law, the court did not have any discretion to
disregard the defendant's failure to comply with the statute.1 s
The Second District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's
order.' 67 The court stated that the trial court should have exercised its
discretion to determine whether PEMHS's failure to make discoverable
information available was unreasonable under the statute. 68 The court
explained that although the statutory language in section 768.57(3)(a)
160. Morris, 532 So. 2d at 1361.
161. Id.
162. 532 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
163. Id. at 61.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 62.
167. Richardson, 532 So. 2d at 63.
168. Id.
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implies mandatory compliance, the legislature, by including the word
"unreasonable," intended that compliance be exercised in a reasonable
manner.'69 Therefore, "subsection (3)(a) should not be interpreted to mean
that in every instance where a party does not cooperate with the insurer or
self-insured in good faith, the party's claim or defenses must be dismissed
as a matter of law.""17  Instead, dismissal is available subject to the
exercise of discretion by the trial court, after it considers whether the
prospective defendant acted unreasonably in failing to perform the statutory
duty to cooperate with the presuit investigation. 7'
H. Reasonable Investigation
Duffy v. Brooker72 provides an excellent discussion of the require-
ments of the statute regarding reasonable investigation. To comply with the
intent of the medical malpractice statutes, the notice of intent and the
corroborating medical expert opinion, taken together, must provide sufficient
information indicating the manner in which the defendant doctor allegedly
deviated from the standard of care. 7 3 Sufficient information is necessary
for the defendants to evaluate the merits of the claim. Additionally, the
response and the corroborating medical expert opinion must also provide
sufficient information to the claimant as to why the defendant doctor did not
purportedly commit malpractice. 74
In Duffy, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's
order imposing sanctions against the defendants for failing to comply with
the reasonable investigations provisions of the presuit screening process
contained in section 766.106.175 The plaintiff served a notice of intent
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. 614 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 624 So. 2d 267 (Fla.
1993).
173. Id. at 545.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 546. Section 766.106(1)-(3) provides in relevant part:
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Claim for medical malpractice" means a claim arising out of the
rendering of, or the failure to render medical care or services.
(b) "Self-insurer" means any self-insurer authorized under s. 627.357 or
any uninsured prospective defendant.
(c) "Insurer" includes the Joint Underwriting Association.
(2) After completion of presuit investigation pursuant to s. 766.203 and
prior to filing a claim for medical malpractice, a claimant shall notify each
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prospective defendant and, if any prospective defendant is a health care provider
licensed under chapter 458, chapter 459, chapter 460, chapter 461, or chapter
466, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation by certified mail,
return receipt requested, of intent to initiate litigation for medical malpractice.
Notice to the Department of Business and Professional Regulation must include
the full name and address of the claimant; the full names and any known
addresses of any health care providers licensed under chapter 458, chapter 459,
chapter 460, chapter 461, or chapter 466 who are prospective defendants
identified at the time; the date and a summary of the occurrence giving rise to
the claim; and a description of the injury to the claimant. The requirement for
notice to the Department of Business and Professional Regulation does not
impair the claimant's legal rights or ability to seek relief for his claim, and the
notice provided to the department is not discoverable or admissible in any civil
or administrative action. The Department of Business and Professional
Regulation shall review each incident and determine whether it involved conduct
by a licensee which is potentially subject to disciplinary action, in which case
the provisions of s. 455.225 apply.
(3)(a) No suit may be filed for a period of 90 days after notice is mailed
to any prospective defendant. During the 90-day period, the prospective
defendant's insurer or self-insurer shall conduct a review to determine the
liability of the defendant. Each insurer or self-insurer shall have a procedure for
the prompt investigation, review, and evaluation of claims during the 90-day
period. This procedure shall include one or more of the following:
1. Internal review by a duly qualified claims adjuster;
2. Creation of a panel comprised of an attorney knowledgeable in the
prosecution or defense of medical malpractice actions, a health care provider
trained in the same or similar medical specialty as the prospective defendant,
and a duly qualified claims adjuster;
3. A contractual agreement with the state or local professional society
of health care providers, which maintains a medical review committee;
4. Any other similar procedure which fairly and promptly evaluates the
pending claim.
Each insurer or self-insurer shall investigate the claim in good faith, and both
the claimant and prospective defendant shall cooperate with the insurer in good
faith. If the insurer requires, a claimant shall appear before a pretrial screening
panel or before a medical review committee and shall submit to a physical
examination, if required. Unreasonable failure of any party to comply with this
section justifies dismissal of claims or defenses. There shall be no civil liability
for participation in a pretrial screening procedure if done without intentional
fraud.
(b) At or before the end of the 90 days, the insurer or self-insurer shall
provide the claimant with a response:
1. Rejecting the claim;
2. Making a settlement offer; or
Vol. 20
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letter on the defendant alleging that the defendant's negligence caused her
husband's death. The notice letter attached a four-page affidavit of a board
certified gastroenterologist and internist. The affidavit stated that there were
reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant committed malpractice in
his care and treatment of the decedent which resulted in his demise. The
affidavit described the documents that were reviewed during the investiga-
tion and the grounds supporting the opinion.'7 6 In response to the notice
of intent to initiate litigation, Mr. Daniel Stephens, a claims adjuster for the
defendant's insurance carrier, sent a letter stating that "[a]fter a thorough
review of this matter, we find no basis to support a claim of negligent injury
against Dr. Patrick Duffy. Thereby your client's claim is hereby denied.
Enclosed is a copy of the required corroborating affidavit to support our
position."77
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant doctor
and filed a Motion Requesting Determination as to Whether [the] Defen-
dant's Denial of Claims Rests on a Reasonable Basis according to section
766.206(1) of the Florida Statutes. 17  Prior to the hearing, the defense
attorney filed a response to the motion and attached to it a sworn statement
3. Making an offer of admission of liability and for arbitration on the
issue of damages. This offer may be made contingent upon a limit of general
damages.
(c) The response shall be delivered to the claimant if not represented-by
counsel or to the claimant's attorney, by certified mail, return receipt requested.
Failure of the prospective defendant or insurer or self-insurer to reply to the
notice within 90 days after receipt shall be deemed a final rejection of the claim
for purposes of this section.
(d) Within 30 days of receipt of a response by a prospective defendant,
insurer, or self-insurer to a claimant represented by an attorney, the attorney
shall advise the claimant in writing of the response, including:
1. The exact nature of the response under paragraph (b).
2. The exact terms of any settlement offer, or admission of liability and
offer of arbitration on damages.
3. The legal and financial consequences of acceptance or rejection of
any settlement offer, or admission of liability, including the provisions of this
section.
4. An evaluation of the time and likelihood of ultimate success at trial
on the merits of the claimant's action.
5. An estimation of the costs and attorney's fees of proceeding through
trial....
FLA. STAT. § 766.106(1)-(3) (Supp. 1994).
176. Duffy, 614 So. 2d at 540.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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by an expert. The sworn statement was identical to the statement in the
initial response letter, but added the following paragraph that "I have
previously rendered said medical opinion on December 11, 1990, and that
said expert opinion was inadvertently not sworn and attested to. My
opinions have not deviated or changed any from the opinion rendered on
December 11, 1990.,,179
The issues presented at the hearing included whether the expert's
statement complied with section 766.203(3) and whether a reasonable
investigation was performed by the insurance company and the expert.18°
The plaintiff had the burden of establishing a prima facie case that she had
complied with the statute, thus shifting the burden to the defendant."' At
the hearing, the claims adjustor testified that while she did not have any
"on-hand" involvement with the review of the claim, she believed that there
was a good faith review and determination by the company that the
defendant was not negligent.
82
After listening to the arguments, the trial judge rejected the defense's
argument and struck the insurance company's response.1 83 The court held
the insurance company "personally responsible to the plaintiff' for
reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred during the investigation of the
claim. 84 The trial court concluded that the insurance company's response
179. Id.
180. Id. at 540-41.
181. Duffy, 614 So. 2d at 541.
182. Id. The claims adjuster who testified at trial was the successor adjuster. She was
not the same person who evaluated the claim upon receipt of plaintiff's notice of intent to
initiate litigation. Id.
183. Id. at 542.
184. Id. The trial judge stated:
There is no factual information of any nature whatsoever in either the letter of
December 13, 1990, from Stephens to plaintiff's attorney or the "CORROBO-
RATION OF MEDICAL EXPERT OPINION" signed by Dr. Edgerton by which
one might "verify" that a "reasonable investigation" had preceded denial by
Physicians of the claim. In particular, the Court notes that, in its opinion, Dr.
Edgerton's statement consists of nothing more than a series of legal conclusions.
It identifies neither the medical records which Dr. Edgerton reviewed nor the
factual bases upon which his ultimate legal conclusion rests. It does not set
forth Dr. Edgerton's professional qualifications, so that one might attempt to
"verify" whether Dr. Edgerton qualifies as a "medical expert," as that term is
defined in § 766.202(5). In fact, it does not even indicate where Dr. Edgerton
practices. Moreover, because of these deficiencies, it is impossible to determine
intelligently whether or not Dr. Edgerton made a "reasonable investigation" (or,
for that matter, whether he made any investigation).
Duffy, 614 So. 2d at 542 (citing FLA. STAT. § 766.205(5)(a) (1989)).
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rejecting the claim "was not in compliance with the 'reasonable investiga-
tion' requirements of the statute and did not rest 'on a reasonable ba-
sis."" 8 To hold otherwise "would fly in the face of the clearly expressed
legislative intent."
186
In affirming the trial court's order, the appellate court reiterated the
purpose of the medical malpractice suit which is to require defendant's to
conduct reasonable investigations in good faith.187 Because the insurance
company failed to comply with the statutory requirements of conducting a
good faith investigation of the allegations set forth by the claimant, the court
properly imposed sanctions against the insurance company. 188 In contrast,
Dressier v. Boca Raton Community Hospital189 illustrates the importance
of complying with the intent of the medical malpractice statutes from the
plaintiffs' perspective. The appellate court upheld the trial court's dismissal
of plaintiff's complaint where the plaintiff failed to provide any information
regarding the manner in which the defendants had allegedly deviated from
the standard of care 1 ° As a result, the stated purpose of the Act was
thwarted and, thus, the court's dismissal of the complaint was proper.
However, nothing in the Act requires the corroborating expert opinion
to identify every possible instance of medical negligence. For example, in
Davis v. Orlando Regional Medical Center,"9 the corroborating affidavit
alleged several acts of negligence against the defendant hospital in causing
injury to the patient.193 Although the affidavit did not mention any post-
surgical negligence, it was revealed during discovery that post-surgical
negligence was in fact an issue. Thus, the hospital sought to exclude that
evidence on the basis that the affidavit failed to mention it.'94 The court
rejected the hospital's position holding that the purpose of the corroborating
opinion is not to require a protracted detail of the plaintiffs theory of the
case.'95 The corroborating opinion simply provides justification for the
plaintiff's claim and demonstrates that it is not frivolous.
185. Id. at 543.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 546.
189. 566 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990), review denied, 581 So. 2d 164 (Fla.
1991).
190. Id. at 574.
191. Id.
192. 654 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
193. Id. at 665.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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In Damus v. Parvez,196 the court was faced with the issue of whether
a physician is obligated to produce a verified medical report where the
physician did not issue a response rejecting the medical malpractice claim.
The defendant doctor did not send the plaintiff a response denying liability.
Instead, the defendant denied liability in his answer to the complaint. The
plaintiff argued that the medical report should be produced in order to
ensure that the denial was made "in good faith." The court held that in
order to comply with the good faith requirement of section 766.206(3), the
report need not be produced prior to an evidentiary hearing where there was
no response rejecting the claim. 197 However, this subjects the physician
to the risk of being sanctioned by the trial court's striking the physician's
pleadings and assessing attorney's fees and costs pursuant to section
766.206(3) if the court finds that good faith was lacking.'98
IV. CONCLUSION
The foregoing is a sampling of the cases decided since the enactment
of the Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1985. Practitio-
ners in this field of law would be well-advised to strictly follow the precise
requirements of the Act. With careful attention to details and the specific
procedures required by the Act, potential difficulties and loss of rights may
be avoided in handling medical malpractice claims or defenses. Of course,
whether the Act will actually accomplish the goals of the Florida Legislature
still remains to be seen.
196. 556 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
197. Id. at 1137-38.
198. Id. at 1138.
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